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Labour is only another name for a human activity
which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not
produced for sale but for entirely different
reasons … the alleged commodity ‘labour power’
cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately or
even left unused, without affecting also the
human individual who happens to be the bearer
of this peculiar commodity.
(Polanyi 1957: 75, 76)
1 Introduction: towards a labour market in China
China’s transformation from a closed, planned
economy to the leading global manufacturer of
export products has entailed a restructuring of
economic and social organisation on a massive scale.
A central feature of this process has been the re-
commodification of labour. The ‘cradle to grave’
protections afforded to urban employees through the
iron rice bowl have been dismantled. Rural producers,
always more exposed to the uncertainties of nature
and the extractive demands of an industrialising state,
were nonetheless provided with basic security
through the collective organisation of production and
a guaranteed right to land. This system of economic
organisation, while institutionalising inequalities
between urban state sector employees and others
(particularly rural residents) provided basic guarantees
of economic security and access to minimal social
provisioning. Commercialisation and decollectivisation
have increased the exposure of rural producers to
markets as new and volatile sources of risk, while the
position of the former urban ‘labour aristocracy’ has
been reduced to that of workers’ selling a commodity
– labour – in an increasingly competitive market.
Through these rapid changes, labour has re-emerged as
an important, if not the main, asset of the working
poor, providing an important link between economic
growth and distributional or welfare outcomes,
particularly for lower income groups. A common
assumption (challenged by articles in this IDS Bulletin) is
that reforms aimed at securing free and flexible labour
markets should generate labour intensive growth
trajectories necessary for poverty reduction. While
China may appear to fit this pattern – having seen rapid
growth, with both an expansion of labour intensive
production and poverty reduction – it is nonetheless
questionable whether the labour elasticity of growth
has been sufficiently high, pro-poor or sustainable (see
Rodgers, this IDS Bulletin). Furthermore, job creation
alone may not be enough: the nature and quality of
jobs is also critical for generating pro-poor or equitable
development outcomes.
What is clear in the Chinese case is that the
conditions under which labour is supplied, exchanged
and rewarded in this emerging ‘market’ have
changed beyond recognition since the start of
economic reform. Negotiations over the value of, or
returns to, labour, and the distribution of these gains;
the role of the state in protecting workers or
incentivising employers; and the restructuring of
social security, are some of the elements
contributing to a major social transformation,
involving protest and struggle over lost entitlements,
greater competition for jobs and opportunities, and a
re-definition of the role of household, society and
state in the reproduction of labour.1
One significant – though under-researched – feature
of this transformation is the rise in ‘informal’
employment. While defining and measuring informal
employment, particularly given currently available
statistics, is not straightforward, there are a number
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of different angles from which to interpret this aspect
of China’s changing economy. It is part of the story of
structural transformation involving the unprecedented
speed of transfer of people out of agriculture into
off-farm employment,2 and of the emergence of a
labour market that appears more closely to
approximate a competitive neoclassical model.
This article focuses on the rise of ‘informality’ in
China’s employment system; it explores the extent to
which conventional labour economic models capture
or explain the reality of this ‘informalisation’ process,
and considers the implications for employment and
social protection. Connecting with the core
questions of this IDS Bulletin, the article explores
what drives precariousness of incomes and jobs in
the context of China’s labour market changes. The
article concludes by discussing what this means for
research – conceptual, statistical measurement, data
collection and empirical analysis – and for policy.
2 Economic transition and the rise of informal
employment
The notion of informality of employment came late
to China. In the 1970s observers described the
emergence of a ‘second economy’ consisting of small
enterprises that had managed to survive or revive
after the political turmoil of previous decades. This
small second economy of informal petty production
and exchange existed, largely hidden from the view
of outside observers, but operating within limits
tolerated by the state. Such activities were
sometimes part of the survival strategies of those
living at the margins of a tightly controlled society;
but were also evidence of nascent entrepreneurship
pushing the limits of such controls, and later able to
blossom into China’s private sector.
During the 1980s, decollectivisation, the emergence
of rural industry and related marketing activities, the
demand for labour in cities and the gradual loosening
of controls on mobility, created a situation where
the rural population – no longer governed by the
commune – could diversify its income generating
activities. The spread of ‘free markets’ and the
greater mobility of farmers able to sell produce to
urban residents, alongside rising incomes and the
demand for new products, created opportunities for
a range of labour use and activities: small food
producers, repairs of shoes, bicycles, collection of
bottles or other items for recycling, and petty trade,
for example, started to proliferate.
Many of these occupations in other contexts would
clearly be classified as ‘informal’. They typically cover
a multiplicity of types of activity – from casual, poorly
paid wage labour, to own production, to
management of enterprises. Variations exist in ease
of entry, capital requirements, competition and
access to markets. In the Chinese context, political
connections or social networks (guanxi) have also
been key determinants of success for private
enterprise. However, some activities on which more
marginal groups depended were challenged by cheap
manufactured products or other substitutes – the
repairs of bowls, pots and pans, and other utensils
that could be easily replaced by factory output, for
example. As Lu Xueyi and his colleagues at CASS
have pointed out in their work on social
stratification,3 the disappearance of some ‘jobs’ and
rapid shifts in occupation or economic activity have
contributed to changes in income levels and
economic status, and in social stratification.
New and diverse forms of economic activity, on the
margins of what was officially sanctioned by the
‘plan’, rapidly emerged in the shadows created by the
withdrawal of the state from some spheres of
economic organisation. This can perhaps most clearly
be seen in the rise of migration and the occupations
into which migrants moved on the fringes of urban
society. By placing themselves in these liminal spaces,
undertaking jobs in construction, street trading,
garbage collection and other less desirable service
work rejected by urban workers, the migrants
themselves – rather than the work they did – became
the ‘marginal’, informal, even ‘illegal’, subjects.
While the activities undertaken by migrants and
other ‘marginal’ workers lend themselves to the
label of ‘informal’ according to conventional
definitions and conceptualisations, this terminology
was not widely applied in China. As elaborated on
below, the formal–informal dichotomy was less
prominent in the Chinese context than the
rural–urban dualism, which structured the types of
employment, status, rights and recognition afforded
to migrants and their work.
The impetus to the recognition of ‘informal’
employment as a policy issue in China can be most
directly linked to the massive layoffs precipitated by
Zhu Rongji’s state enterprise reforms from the mid-
1990s. This radical restructuring created a level of
unemployment not previously seen in the People’s
Republic, which in turn generated a political
challenge to the stability and legitimacy of the
regime. The government responded initially with
transitional measures to address the basic needs of
those laid-off (xiagang) workers affected directly by
restructuring.4 It soon became clear, however, that
‘high’ levels of unemployment would remain a
feature of the reformed economy; that many
‘working’ people were no longer earning enough to
provide an acceptable living standard, and that job
creation was insufficient to re-employ redundant
workers and to absorb new labour force entrants or
the ‘hidden’ unemployed.
In other words, the limit to labour re-commodification
became quickly apparent. The state needed to find
other mechanisms to protect workers, ensure social
reproduction of labour and social provisioning, in
order to maintain social stability and uphold the
legitimacy of the Party-led state.
In response, the government introduced new types
of active labour policies, with massive programmes
of skills training, the establishment of ‘labour
exchanges’ to assist workers in finding jobs, and the
creation of ‘community-based’ employment
schemes. Many of the new ‘jobs’ created in this way
were short term, part-time and designed as
transitional rather than longer term measures – or, in
the Chinese terminology – ‘flexible’ (linghuo).
Significantly, this was part of a more fundamental
recognition that ‘standard’ (biaozhun) employment
with long-term contracts and social security could
not remain the sole or ideal type. Supplementing
these labour market measures, a second major strand
in the government’s response has been the
development and expansion of new forms of social
insurance to replace those previously provided by the
work unit. Initially, transitional measures were put in
place to provide benefits to those laid off, while
longer-term arrangements were developed (Cook
1999). Contributory pensions, unemployment and
health insurance programmes were subsequently
introduced for urban employees; these are being
expanded to dependents, and in some cases to self-
employed and migrant workers (particularly in the
more developed cities such as Shanghai. Social
assistance programmes are also being rolled out, the
principal one being a means-tested cash transfer
programme (the Minimum Living Standard
Programme or dibao).5 Finally, and most recently a
number of new labour laws and policies have been
introduced or are under discussion aimed at
promoting employment and protecting workers
through contracts.
Throughout this structural adjustment process, the
state-led terminology was focused on laid-off
workers (xiagang zhigong) and re-employment (zai
jiuye). The political sensitivity of rising unemployment
(shiye) needed to be downplayed;6 where laid off
workers were unable to get new jobs, this was often
blamed on their low ‘quality’ (suzhi) and unsuitability
for work in the new competitive labour market
(Cook and Jolly 2000). While many of these workers
found what can only be described as ‘informal’ work
to generate incomes, such activities went largely
unobserved and unreported.
Around this time, the terminology of informal
employment (feizhengui jiuye) entered the policy
discourse, largely through the activities of donors,
such as the ILO.7 Academics were slow to take up
these issues, while the government deliberately
adopted the preferred term of ‘flexible’ employment
(linghuo jiuye) rather than the more negative
sounding term ‘informal’ to refer to such part-time,
often low paid and unprotected work. In comparison
with the reforms in Latin America described as
‘flexibilisation at the margins’ (Tokman, this IDS
Bulletin) restructuring was radical, but was presented
as a way to create a more flexible and competitive
labour market which would be in the long-term
interests of workers (Solinger 2002: 313). The degree
of informalisation of labour, and the multiple forms
of informality in terms of work conditions and
employment relations, emerging from this process
remains an under-researched area.
3 Analysing the labour market in China: stylised
fact or ‘theoretical make-believe’?8
As is clear from the above discussion, the first three
decades of reform gave rise to diverse forms of
economic activity which could well be described as
‘informal’. These however remained largely invisible in
terms of official policy discourse, statistical data and
academic analysis. Why has the notion of informality
received so little attention (until recently) in China? To
some extent, as implied in the preceding discussion, this
lack of recognition was a political issue. The multiple
challenges posed by labour market changes in a
transitional economy included the threat to the
political legitimacy of the ‘workers’ state’, the
ideological difficulty for the Communist Party in
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accepting rapid private sector growth; and the
adaptation of a relatively inflexible administrative system
to these new realities. Two further explanations are
suggested here, arising from theoretical approaches to
the analysis of labour markets, and the inability to
capture in existing statistics these new employment
forms and categories. Together, the limits of theory
and empirical analysis create a gap between the
frameworks or ‘models’ and the reality.
In terms of the theoretical constructs or models of
the labour market, two main economic approaches
have dominated the analysis of labour markets in
developing countries, and this applies equally to
China. In a brief and simplified characterisation, we
sketch two frameworks broadly reflecting the
approaches of development and labour economists.
Development economists building on Lewis’s initial
insights tend to focus on China’s structural
transformation and the transfer of its vast supply of
‘surplus’ labour from agricultural to non-agricultural
activities. At an aggregate level, economic
restructuring has involved a rapid shift of labour out
of low productivity agriculture, where marginal
returns are close to zero, into higher productivity
work: first off the land into off-farm rural
employment and TVEs, and subsequently out of the
countryside and into the cities. This analysis is linked
to a particular view of modernity through which
industrialisation and the growth of manufacturing will
provide jobs to absorb the rural labour force, putting
countries on a path towards capital accumulation,
investment and development. Such processes provide
a major impetus for labour market transformation, as
well as for deeper social and economic change in
‘real’ markets, and improvements in incomes,
consumption and wellbeing.
The development literature on structural
transformations in other parts of the world since the
1970s has tended to incorporate some analysis of
informal employment as part of this process. The
‘dualist’ or sectoral perspective has portrayed informal
employment as a stepping stone on the route
towards more formal, ‘modern’ jobs, even while
scholars have debated the function of such
employment (as safety net, transitional mechanism, or
subsidy to the formal capitalist sector). In China, the
language of ‘informality’ in employment was never
part of this discussion. Instead, a multitude of
employment types emerged: household sidelines and
individual household production (getihu), TVEs under
collective or quasi-private ‘red-hat’ ownership; small
private enterprises (siying qiye), etc. These activities and
their related employment arrangements and
relationships pushed at the limits of state sanctioned
activity, but the state found ways to embrace some of
them, gradually regulating and legitimising them, or
incorporating them within law and policy. Communist
ideology and state control however, meant there was
little space for activities which fell outside acceptable
definitions, but which continued to exist at the
boundaries of formal, sanctioned activity.9
More significantly, this literature on China was
dominated both from academic and policy
perspectives by the more deeply entrenched
institutional dualism of Chinese society – the
rural–urban divide. A huge body of research, policy
and more recently activism has been devoted to
migration, the ‘floating population’ (liudong renkou)
and rural workers in the cities (nongmin gong) by
development economists and other social scientists.
Since the early 1990s, a large literature has
developed as researchers explored the numbers
involved, who was moving, why; for what kind of
work; and with what implications for receiving and
sending areas, and for the individuals and their
families.10 Development economists have focused
mainly on the structural economic and demographic
transformations associated with this change, and the
obstacles created in particular by the household
registration (hukou) system. The rural–urban division
has thus been more significant than the
informal–formal distinction in the Chinese context.
The second major approach in the literature has
been the work of a group of applied labour
economists who have analysed the evolution of
China’s labour market since the 1980s as the system
of labour allocation was relaxed, wage and price
reforms and some degree of managerial autonomy
over employees were introduced, and more diverse
forms of ownership developed. A rich body of
literature has emerged in this vein, essentially
exploring a central question of how far China’s
system of labour allocation and the rewards to
labour has moved towards a neoclassical, competitive
‘labour market’? Micro-econometric analyses have
examined the allocation of labour, productivity and
rewards, and returns to education and human capital.
By examining labour in different types of activity,
enterprise and ownership type, scholars have been
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able to trace changes towards a more competitive
labour market in which the role of social networks
and political connections have diminished, and
education and skills are increasingly rewarded, and
productivity has increased. Overall, with some
variation in results depending on available data, the
story presented is of a trajectory from allocated
labour with low productivity and few rewards to one
increasingly responsive to market signals and
incentives, with greater rewards to education
(although evidence is mixed), and in which workers
have greater mobility to move to jobs in which they
are most productive.11
While these two approaches help to understand
major changes occurring within the Chinese economy,
the limits to these analyses are apparent when we
consider the question of ‘transition to what’? The
‘stylised’ perfectly competitive market of neoclassical
economics is nowhere reality (Heintz, this IDS Bulletin).
The institutional underpinnings of real markets have
tended to be neglected features of these analyses –
often the unexplained residual or evidence of market
imperfections or failure. There is inadequate attention
to the distributional impacts: ‘losers’ are those who
lack the human capital or other characteristics that
enable them to compete in the market. Unexplained
biases, such as lower pay or reduced labour force
participation of women, are usually seen as
‘discrimination.’ As both Heintz and Lund (this IDS
Bulletin) point out, the nature of labour as a socially
produced factor of production has received little
attention: in the Chinese case this matters where state
provided welfare including child care, health and
support for the elderly have been withdrawn and
replaced usually by unpaid female labour within the
household.12 The political, social and institutional
underpinnings and constraints on ‘real’ labour markets
thus remain largely outside these models.
The two approaches of development and labour
economists come together around the issue of
migration and the effects of labour mobility. The
movement of labour out of agriculture proved one
of the major push factors in diversifying employment
types and creating a vibrant private sector and a
more competitive labour market. Currently however,
the debate is shifting to the question of whether
China has reached a ‘turning point’ in terms of the
Lewis surplus labour model. By the early years of the
twenty-first century, after almost a decade of
stagnation in real wages, export factories in southern
China are beginning to report a shortage of certain
types of labour, leading to upward pressure on
wages and the movement of more factories inland.13
The unlimited rural labour supply appears to be
drying up and a tighter labour market emerging.
This possibility raises questions about the directions
of further labour market developments, including the
implications for wage levels, working conditions and
labour protection, for the continued creation of low
wage jobs producing for global markets, and for the
level and nature of formal or informal employment.
4 Data and measurement: how big is informal
employment in China?
A second reason for the invisibility of informal
employment in debates in China arises from the
nature of the statistics collected, which do not allow
for easy identification of work types that do not fit
the ‘standard’ definitions.14 This section briefly reviews
the methods and data used, and their limitations.
At an aggregate level, the main approach for
calculating the extent of informality in the urban
labour force is a ‘residual’ method, which estimates
the difference between the total labour force (based
on census and labour force survey data) and the
administrative reporting by enterprises of ‘formal’
employees. In the mid-1990s, just before enterprise
restructuring started, urban employment was
approximately 190 million, of which 144 million were
state employees, 13.7 million formal private sector
employees, and the remaining 32.6 million could
then be classified as ‘informal’. It was in 1998 that
the start of the decline in reported employees was
seen. By 2004, state sector employees were reduced
by half (to 78 million), registered (‘formal’) private
sector was 61.3 million, while the total urban
employment had increased to around 265 million,
leaving approximately 125 million (over 50 per cent)
loosely classified as ‘informal’ (NBS 2005; World
Bank 2007).
A second method, using sample survey data, uses the
specific characteristics of jobs to estimate the level of
informality. Various datasets have been used to
generate results also in the region of 50 per cent of
urban employment, and 80–85 per cent of migrant
employment (Wu and Cai 2006; Cai et al. 2006).
These sources may potentially yield the most
accurate results depending on the data. Current data
sets are limited in the questions they have asked, and
Cook The Challenge of Informality: Perspectives on China’s Changing Labour Market52
risk tautology in that informality is defined in terms
characteristics available in the data (most commonly
the lack of a contract and social security coverage).
Given the transitional nature of China’s employment
and social security system, these variables may not be
accurate indicators of the precarious type of jobs of
most concern; they may include white collar
professionals; while information about some of the
most precarious forms of work, or activities of the
most vulnerable people, may be excluded from
survey data. Thus biases could be in either direction.
In general however, this combination of conceptual
and measurement problems make it impossible to
understand the precise nature of the jobs, work
conditions and social protection status of many of
these workers. The residual approach captures a
range of ‘non-standard’ forms of employment, which
may be ‘informal’ to the extent that they do not
conform to certain definitions and legal
requirements, but may not be precarious, insecure or
poorly paid. An increasing number of private sector
professionals working individually as consultants for
example may fall into these categories. A further
limitation of much data on employment – and one
that is not easily overcome, is the issue of adequately
capturing migrant employment in urban surveys. As
migrants predominate in informal jobs and
precarious forms of work this is potentially an
important source of bias. From a policy perspective,
and for understanding the relationship between
informality, poverty and welfare, we need more
finely tuned ways of disaggregating employment
types. Overall, a clearer conceptualisation of the
issues, improved definitions and better designed
survey instruments are needed in order to measure
and analyse the issues of concern for policy. More
recent data collected by the NBS (including the 2005
1 per cent population survey and revised labour force
surveys) have followed ILO standards for questions on
employment and may allow for more robust and
comparable statistics.
5 Real markets, institutions and informal
employment
Given the conceptual and methodological limitations
described above, how should we attempt to
understand the informalisation of labour in China,
and what research gaps need to be filled?
For socialist states, creating market-based systems
entails large and politically difficult adjustments of
institutions, including the structure of economic
production and the distribution of benefits to
workers. These changes impact on the daily lives and
livelihoods of tens of millions of Chinese workers.
The re-negotiation of social contracts associated
with this transition, and the reconfiguration of
relations between state, household and market, are
all part of changing institutional arrangements
within which real markets are embedded. In such
contexts, social factors play a role in shaping markets,
in determining who moves in and out of different
forms of work; and the pathways along which entry
and exit take place.
In the above discussion, entry into informal work has
focused first, on factors related to economic
transformation and rural to urban migration, with
migrant labour entering the urban workforce
creating competitive pressures at least at the lower
end of the income spectrum; and second, as a result
of ‘shock’ reform measures which pushed ‘formal’ or
protected workers in some cases into low income
jobs previously done by migrants (service, petty trade,
garbage collection). Another part of the story relates
to growth: China’s strong export growth and the
demand of factories for cheap labour; rapid
urbanisation and infrastructure development
requiring labour in construction; and increased
incomes and consumer demand resulting in an
increase demand for services. Within these activities,
we see different degrees of informality: the value
chain for export manufacturers for example may
range from formal to factory-based work with
limited social protection, to informal and
unprotected sub-contracting arrangements. In
construction, various arrangements for ‘contracting’
labour through middle men or gang leaders often
leave the workers vulnerable to abuse even to the
extent of not being paid or becoming essentially
bonded labour. In the service sector conditions of
employment tend to be insecure and unprotected.
The nature of ‘precarious’ work – as in most
contexts, thus ranges along a spectrum with the
least visible ‘workers’ (engaged in activities that may
not even be thought of as ‘work’) generally being the
most vulnerable.
The degree of vulnerability faced by such workers is
constructed both by the work they do, and by their
status. Migrants are particularly vulnerable as they
lack ‘citizenship’ status and rights in their place of
work, have limited, if any claims to social protection
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from the local authorities and few mechanisms of
recourse. Changes in the hukou arrangements and
efforts to extend social insurance programmes may
shift the problem from that of ‘migrants’ to one of
the nature of employment. However, mechanisms
for enforcement of standards set out in labour and
other laws will take time to take effect.
Another way of defining informality, or of
understanding entry into the ‘sector’, is in terms of
degrees of regulation and legality – as a ‘choice’ to
avoid burdensome regulations or taxation. Informality
may also arise in the absence of relevant institutions
for enforcement of formal rules. In the Chinese
context, there is a large volume of relevant laws on
labour, often with poor enforcement. Other laws or
regulations relating to registration, tax or other
administrative issues may – in the absence of
impartial courts or corrupt government systems –
lead enterprises to avoid formality and reduce their
relationship with the state. Thus a variety of formal
and informal institutional arrangements influence
the behaviour of entrepreneurs and employers,
creating varying forms of informal employment.
These examples illustrate the importance of an
institutional approach that identifies the concrete
realities of specific arrangements on the ground, and
which allow us to understand what is happening to
informal employment during a process of rapid
structural transformation; such analysis may in turn
help us to better understand institutional dynamics
underpinning market development. Questions should
focus on understanding the different logics behind
informality of employment (e.g. subsistence or
survival; maximising returns; shifting costs and risks
(from formal businesses) or avoiding legal
obligations). Such an approach would also call for
understanding both formal institutions as well as the
range of non-state and informal institutions or forms
of regulation which shape labour relations and
outcomes. Closely linked to the discussion of
institutions is an issue of the role of governments in
regulating the economy, when it chooses to
intervene and enforce, and for what reasons.
6 Conclusions – the persistent puzzle of
informality
In conclusion, we are left with the puzzle of how to
think about informalisation of employment in the
Chinese context: is it evidence of a better functioning,
more competitive labour market? Or is it instead the
emergence of something dysfunctional or
pathological? Or is it yet another phase in an ongoing
process of transition (to what)? In some parts of the
literature it is interpreted as evidence of greater
competition, economic dynamism and the source of
job creation (World Bank 2007); in which case, how
much ‘informal’ (flexible, unregulated and
unprotected) employment is acceptable? Alternatively,
it is presented (particularly by policymakers) as
something undesirable, to be regulated and
formalised. Given that the state socialist system has
been rejected as inefficient, the capitalist market
system does not yet function, and the ‘real markets’
of informal institutions and allocative mechanisms are
seen as in some way dysfunctional, what would the
institutional arrangements for an acceptable well-
functioning labour market, with some level of labour
protection, look like?
This raises a further question: how useful is the
concept of informal employment in such a context?
One argument is that it is not helpful: the conditions
of ‘formality’ (or excessive regulation) have been
undermined and eroded to such an extent that the
dualism implied by the terminology is irrelevant; it
lacks predictive or explanatory power – it describes
but does not explain. Nonetheless, informality
remains a useful concept or category for making
visible hidden areas of the economy and labour
market. While it may have limited utility as an
analytic construct, it is helpful at a descriptive level. It
provides a way to distinguish certain features (though
hiding others). The issue is to refocus on what is of
concern, and what can/should be done about it.
Going beyond the terminology, we need to
recognise and understand real phenomenon in the
economy, including the role of social structures and
institutions. In the Chinese context, it is necessary for
example to distinguish between the very different
pathways into informality, and different outcomes,
for migrants as opposed to urban laid-off workers.
Informal employment thus challenges ‘mainstream’
economics: its size and more significantly, continued
growth contradict the predictions of mainstream
economic analysis. It has many manifestations and
functions: from more to less productive activity; from
acting as a ‘safety net’ during economic downturn to
a driver of growth in rapidly expanding economies; it
is located throughout the economy – in areas
thought of as ‘formal’, such as modern factories and
industrial clusters, as well as in more traditional and
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marginal sectors. These realities challenge
fundamental ideas about development, labour
markets and appropriate macro economic policies.
They also have wide implications for regulatory
regimes including tax and social security systems.
In the context of globalisation, rapid growth and
continued informalisation, it seems that the kind of
jobs and welfare provisions aspired to as part of the
‘modern’ sector of developed economies may no
longer be a realistic aspiration, or necessarily an
accepted part of the social contract at the state level.
The Chinese government has accepted flexible
employment (a term sometimes used interchangeably
with informal) as a policy objective, part of the
process of creating a more efficient labour market; at
the same time it remains uneasy about informal
employment, wanting to organise and in some way
formalise it, creating regulations which in turn
provide incentives for employers to retreat into
informality. The problem remains that creating an
‘efficient’ market for labour as a commodity sits
uncomfortably with the overriding political objectives
of a stable and ‘harmonious’ society.
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Notes
1 An extensive literature has emerged around
labour rights, social security and protest in the
context of state sector restructuring; see for
example Chan (2001); Lee (2007a,b); Solinger
(2002) and Tang (2007), among others.
2 Agricultural employment declined from 70 per
cent of the total in 1978 to approximately 45 per
cent by 2005 (World Bank 2007).
3 Personal discussions, Beijing 2005.
4 For details of these transitional measures, see for
example Cook (1999), Solinger (2002).
5 For details, see Cook (2002) and Tang et al. (2000)
6 Results from a major survey of unemployment in
66 cities by MOLSS in 1999 were not released,
and the data has not been fully analysed, due in
part to sensitivity over the high levels of
unemployment found.
7 The ILO-Socio-Economic Security project had a
component in China.
8 As discussed by Heintz, in this IDS Bulletin.
9 Some comparisons may be possible here with the
barely recognised world of informal finance
which, as documented in detail by Tsai (2002),
was critical to the growth of the private sector.
10 There is an extensive literature on migration
issues: see World Bank 2007 for a recent review.
11 Some of the key works or authors have been
Knight and Song (2005); Xin Meng (2000), and
work by Cai Fang and colleagues at CASS,
including Cai et al. 2006.
12 See, for example MacPhail and Dong 2007 and
other articles in the Journal of Feminist Economics,
volumes 13 and 14, 2007.
13 Work by economists at CASS, such as Cai et al.
2006 have presented this argument; see also ‘Last
call for Guangdong shoemakers’, Asia Times on-
line, www.atimes.com (accessed: 5 February
2008).
14 Similar problems are also evident around
estimates of China’s unemployment rate: see for
example Giles et al. (2005) and Solinger (2001).
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